

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 IO-10 ISO-00 SS-15 NSC-05 DODE-00

CIAE-00 PM-03 INR-07 L-02 ACDA-05 NSAE-00 PA-01

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 410

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

USLO SACLANT

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1150

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, SF, UN

SUBJ: VISIT OF CHAIRMAN OF UN SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST

APARTHEID WITH SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS

SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS HAS CIRCULATED FOR INFORMATION OF
AMBASSADORS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS THE SPEAKING NOTES GIVEN TO
HIM ON FEBRUARY 14 BY AMBASSADOR OGBU, CHAIRMAN OF UN SPECIAL
COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID. LUNS ALSO ENCLOSED NOTES MADE
BY HIS STAFF DURING CONVERSATION. TEXT OF OGBU'S SPEAKING
NOTES, AND MADE BY LUNS' AIDES, FOLLOWS:

BEGIN TEXT:

VISIT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL
COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID, AMBASSADOR OGBU

I ENCLOSE FOR THE INFORMATION OF AMBASSADORS AND
THEIR GOVERNMENTS THE SPEAKING NOTES GIVEN ME BY AMBASSADOR
OGBU WHEN HE CALLED ON ME ON FRIDAY, 14TH FEBRUARY.

2. I ALSO ENCLOSE THE NOTES MADE BY MY STAFF RECORDING
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OUR CONVERSATION.

(SIGNED) JOSEPH M.A.H. LUNS

NOTE FOR MEETING WITH HIS EXCELLENCY DR. JOSEPH M.A.H. LUNS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

AS YOU KNOW THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID
IS CHARGED BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH FOLLOWING
THE DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA AND
PROMOTING IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS.

THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, AS YOU KNOW,
WAS INSTITUTED AS EARLY AS 1963 BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND
SUPPORTED ALMOST UNANIMOUSLY BY THE MEMBER STATES - THOUGH THERE
HAVE BEEN A FEW LOOPHOLES WHICH HAVE BEEN OF CONCERN TO US.

WE FEEL THAT THE ARMS EMBARGO IS THE FIRST AND
MINIMUM ACTION WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN BY ALL STATES WHICH ARE
AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND APARTHEID. WE HAVE BEEN
TRYING TO PERSUADE ALL STATES - ESPECIALLY A FEW WHICH HAVE NOT
FULLY IMPLEMENTED THE EMBARGO - THAT THERE SHOULD BE NOT
RESERVATIONS OR QUALIFICATIONS ON THIS MINIMUM STEP.

WE ARE PARTICULARLY ENXIOUS ABOUT THIS BECAUSE WE
FEEL THAT THE ARMS EMBARGO IS ONE MEANS TO MINIMIZE THE DANGER
OF A WIDER CONFLICT WHICH, IN THE CONTEXT OF THE RACIAL SITUATION
IN SOUTH AFRICA, CAN BE DISASTROUS FOR ALL OF US.

AS YOU KNOW, FIFTEEN YEARS AGO, WHEN MANY OF THE
AFRICAN COUNTRIES WERE GETTING INDEPENDENT, THE WHITES IN
SOUTH AFRICA SAW THE CHANGES AS A DANGER RATHER THAN AN
OPPORTUNITY. THEY BEGAN AN EXPANSION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND
SUPPRESSED THE NON-BIOLENT MOVEMENT OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE.
THE MILITARY BUDGET HAS INCREASED FROM ABOUT 44 MILLION RAND
IN 1960-61 TO 692 MILLION RAND IN THE CURRENT YEAR, OR BY ABOUT
16 TIMES. THERE HAS BEEN A CONSTANT ESCALATION OF TENSION.

INSTEAD OF SEEKING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BY CONCILIATION,
SOUTH AFRICA HAS BEEN DEPENDING ON MILITARY POWER. IT HAS
DEFIED THE UNITED NATIONS IN NAMIBIA AND SENT FORCES INTO
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RHODESIA.

WE FEEL THAT THIS CONSTANT EXPANSION OF MILITARY
FORCES IN SOUTH AFRICA SERVES NOBODY. THE AFRICAN STATES HAVE
NEVER THREATENED SOUTH AFRICA AND HAVE, IN FACT, SPENT LITTLE
FOR MILITARY EXPANSION. BUT SOUTH AFRICA NOW POSES A MILITARY
THREAT WITH ITS ENORMOUS ARMOURY OF SPOHISTICATED EQUIPMENT.
MORE IMPORTANT, I BELIEVE, IS THE FACT THAT THIS MILITARY BUILD-
UP HAS TENDED TO BLIND THE WHITES TO REALITY.

WE FEEL THAT IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT OTHER COUNTRIES

SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY ASSIST SOUTH AFRICA IN ITS MILITARY BUILD-UP BECAUSE THAT GIVES RESPECTABILITY TO APARTHEID AND ENCOURAGES THE REGIME TO DEFY THE UNITED NATIONS WITH IMPUNITY.

THAT IS THE MINIMUM THE WORLD SHOULD DO TO DEMONSTRATE ITS ABHORRENCE OF APARTHEID.

THE RECENT SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADOPTED A SPECIAL RESOLUTION ON THE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA, REQUESTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO TAKE ACTION, UNDER CHAPTER VII, TO ENSURE THE COMPLETE CESSATION BY ALL STATES OF THE SUPPLY OF ANY ARMS, AMMUNITIONS, MILITARY VEHICLES, SPARE PARTS, AND ANY OTHER MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AS WELL AS ANY MILITARY CO-OPERATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

WE HOPE TO HAVE A DISCUSSION IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL SOON, AND WE ARE UNDERTAKING ADVANCE CONSULTATIONS WITH VARIOUS POWERS IN ORDER TO OBTAIN EFFECTIVE ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE HAVE BEEN IN CONSULTATION, FOR INSTANCE, WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM AND WE WERE SATISFIED THAT THEY HAVE FINALLY DECIDED TO ABROGATE THE SIMONSTOWN NAVAL AGREEMENT WITH SOUTH AFRICA. I HOPE TO VISIT WASHINGTON SOON FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT.

IT IS PARTICULARLY IN THE CONTEXT OF THESE CONSULTATIONS THAT I HAVE BEEN ASKED BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO MEET WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY AND I AM VERY GRATEFUL FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY.

I MIGHT SAY THAT I HAVE TWO MAIN PURPOSES ON THIS MISSION. FIRST, TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO VARIOUS REPORTS IN
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THE PRESS AND ELSEWHERE WHICH HAVE CAUSED US CONCERN AND TO SEEK CLARIFICATIONS.

THE REPORTS ARE SOMETIMES CONTRADICTORY OR UNCLEAR AND HAVE CAUSED SOME CONFUSION, AND WE ARE ANXIOUS TO OBTAIN AUTHORITATIVE INFORMATION SO THAT THERE WILL BE NO UNNECESSARY MISUNDERSTANDINGS.

MY SECOND PURPOSE IS TO APPEAL TO YOU, AND THROUGH YOU TO THE NATO, FOR CO-OPERATION IN OUR EFFORTS TO TIGHTEN UP THE ARMS EMBARGO.

THE ATTENTION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE HAS BEEN DRAWN TO REPORTS THAT THE NATO HAS ASKED THE SACLANT (SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER ATLANTIC) TO PREPARE CONTINGENCY PLANS CONCERNING SEA ROUTES AROUND THE CAPE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR EXCELLENCY'S ATTENTION HAS BEEN DRAWN TO THE MANY PRESS REPORTS ON THIS MATTER AND TO THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN VARIOUS QUARTERS.

BEFORE THESE REPORTS, WE HAD HEARD THAT VARIOUS
PARLIAMENTARIANS - ESPECIALLY SOME BRITISH CONSERVATIVE
POLITICIANS - IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY WERE CALLING FOR
NATO INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA. WE ALSO READ OF DENIALS BY
YOU AND YOUR SPOKESMEN THAT ANY SUCH INVOLVEMENT WAS
CONTEMPLATED.

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BUT WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE DECISION TO ASK SACLANT
TO PREPARE A STUDY WAS TAKEN BY THE MINISTERIAL SESSION OF THE
DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE, AN OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE NATO.

ACCORDING TO THE PRESS, THE NATO SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED
ON 19TH MAY LAST YEAR THAT A DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN.

THIS SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT
GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT. THEY SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT AL THEIR
LOBBYING OVER THE YEARS IS FINALLY PRODUCING SOME RESULTS.

WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR ANY CLARIFICATION BY YOU
ON THE DECISION TAKEN BY NATO AND AS TO WHERE THE MATTER STANDS
NOW.

SECONDLY, AFTER THE RECENT BRITISH DECISION TO
ABROGATE THE SIMONSTOWN AGREEMENT, THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS
IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS THAT THE NATO OR SOME OF THE MAIN
NATO MEMBERS ARE CONCERNED AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE AN
ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT. SOME OF THESE REPORTS ARE CARRIED NOT
ONLY BY THE PRESS BUT ALSO BY THE OFFICIAL SOUTH AFRICAN
BROADCASTING CORPORATION.

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NATURALLY, WE CANNOT RELY ON THE PRESS REPORTS, BUT THIS IS SUCH A SENSITIVE MATTER FOR US THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO BE REASSURED.

THIRDLY, OUR ATTENTION HAS BEEN DRAWN TO REPORTS THAT MILITARY EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURED UNDER NATO AGREEMENTS HAS BEEN SOLD TO SOUTH AFRICA -FOR INSTANCE, PLANES PRODUCED IN FRANCE IN COLLABORATION WITH OTHER NATO MEMBERS WHICH IMPLEMENT THE ARMS EMBARGO.

WE BELIEVE THAT IT IS ONLY BY MAKING CLEAR TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN REGIME THAT IT CANNOT EXPECT ANY CO-OPERATION FROM THE REST OF THE WORLD IF IT FOLLOWS ITS PAST COURSE, THAT WE CAN HAVE ANY HOPE OF A POSITIVE EVOLUTION. IN THIS RESPECT, WE FEEL THAT THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE NATO CAN MAKE THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTION.

I WOULD, THEREFORE, CONCLUDE BY CONVEYING TO YOU THE APPEAL OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE THAT THE NATO WILL AVOID ANY FORM OF CO-OPERATION OR CONTACT WITH SOUTH AFRICA AND WILL ASSIST US, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, IN MAKING THE ARMS EMBARGO EFFECTIVE.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

1. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMITTEE AGAINST APARTHEID, AMBASSADOR EDWIN OGBE OGBU, ACCOMPANIED BY AN INDIAN MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AFRICAN SECTION, SAW ME 14TH FEBRUARY FOR ABOUT FORTY MINUTES. HE READ OUT FROM SPEAKING NOTES, A COPY OF WHICH IS ENCLOSED HERewith. THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, MR. KASTL, TOOK NOTES FOR ME.

2. IN MY REPLY (WHICH MY VISITORS TAPE RECORDED) I EXPRESSED MY APPRECIATION OF THE AMBASSADOR'S VISIT AND WELCOMED THE OPPORTUNITY TO CLEAR UP POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS REGARDING NATO. CONTRARY TO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, NATO HAD NO SUPRA-NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS, HENCE I HAD NO POWER TO IMPOSE UPON THE COUNCIL DECISIONS WHICH WERE, IN FACT, GOVERNED BY THE RULE OF UNANIMITY.

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3. NATO, WHICH WAS NOT ONLY A MILITARY BUT ALSO A POLITICAL INSTITUTION, TOOK A KEEN INTEREST ALSO IN AFRICAN EVENTS. UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS ON APARTHEID IN AFRICA WERE THEREFORE KNOWN TO THE NATO COUNTRIES. I SAID THAT THERE

MIGHT HAVE BEEN INDIVIDUAL VOICES IN SOME MEMBER STATES SPEAKING IN FAVOUR OF CLOSER LINKS BETWEEN NATO AND SOUTH AFRICA. AGAINST THIS, HOWEVER, STOOD TWO BARRIERS: THE NEED FOR UNANIMITY AS REGARDS ANY ALLIED DECISION IN THAT SENSE, AND NATO'S TERRITORIAL LIMIT OF THE TROPIC OF CANCER AS DEFINED BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY.

4. REGARDING EMERGENCY PLANS UNDERTAKEN BY SACLAN, I GAVE THE FOLLOWING CLARIFICATIONS: IN THE WAKE OF THE CLOSING OF THE SUEZ CANAL THE CAPE ROUTE HAD BECOME MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER. ITS STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE HAD BEEN COMPOUNDED BY THE DRAMATIC SOVIET NAVAL BUILD-UP OVER RECENT YEARS. ALLIED COUNTRIES COULD NOT HOPE THAT IN THE EVENT OF WAR A POTENTIAL ENEMY WOULD RESPECT NATO'S TERRITORIAL LIMITS. THEREFORE, ALLIED MINISTERS HAD TAKEN THE POLITICAL DECISION TO INSTRUCT SACLAN TO PREPARE EMERGENCY PLANS FOR THE PROTECTION OF SEA LANES IN CASE OF WAR (AND NOT IN PEACETIME*). ANY TECHNICAL OR POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA HAD BEEN EXPRESSLY EXCLUDED FROM THE PREPARATION OF THOSE EMERGENCY PLANS.

5. THE RATHER LIMITED EXPANSION OF SOUTH AFRICAN NAVAL FORCES HAD BEEN CARRIED OUT WITHOUT ANY ASSISTANCE FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AS SUCH. FURTHERMORE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVAL EXPANSION HAD ONLY FOLLOWED THE SOVIET NAVAL EXPANSION IN THAT AREA. FINALLY, THE SOUTH AFRICAN NAVY DID NOT SEEM TO BE THE APPROPRIATE MEANS OF ENHANCING THE POLICY OF APARTHEID ON THE AFRICAN POPULATION.

6. I SAID I COULD GUARANTEE TO AMBASSADOR OGBU THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO PRESSURE WHATSOEVER BY ANY ALLIED COUNTRY TO ENVISAGE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ABROAGED SIMONSTOWN AGREEMENT.

7. AS REGARDS ARMS DELIVERIES BY ALLIED COUNTRIES, THERE WERE NO MEANS EITHER OF IMPOSING ANY DECISIONS, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, ON INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES: NATO, AS SUCH, COULD NOT FORBID ANY COUNTRY TO SELL ARMS TO ANY THIRD COUNTRY.
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FURTHERMORE, THERE DID NOT EXIST ANY "NATO WEAPONS". WHAT DID EXIST WAS ONLY THE FACT THAT CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL NATIONS WITHIN NATO DEVELOPED AND PRODUCED SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN COMMON.

8. I WARMLY WELCOMED THE FACT THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD MENTIONED CERTAIN ENCOURAGING SYMPTOMS IN SOUTH AFRICAN POLICIES TOWARDS THE AFRICAN POPULATION AND SOUTH AFRICA'S NEIGHBOURS. IN CONCLUDING, I STRONGLY STRESSED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NEITHER MILITARY NOR POLITICAL CONTACTS BETWEEN NATO AND SOUTH AFRICA LIABLE TO ENHANCE THE POSITION AND INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE OF THE LATTER. I THANKED AMBASSADOR OGBU FOR THIS EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND ASKED HIM TO CONVEY MY PERSONAL REGARDS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE.

9. THE AMBASSADOR AND HIS COMPANY LEFT, CLEARLY WITH A
FEELING OF DEEP SATISFACTION. JOSEPH M.A.H. LUNS

END TEST. BRUCE

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